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This paper compares solvency capital requirements under Solvency I and Solvency II for a sample mid-size insurance portfolio. According to the results of a study, changing the solvency capital regime from Solvency I to Solvency II will lead to a substantial additional solvency capital requirement that might represent a heavy burden for the company's shareholders.
One way to reduce the capital requirement under Solvency II is to increase reinsurance protection, which will reduce the net retained risk exposure and hence also the solvency capital requirement. Therefore, this paper proposes an extended reinsurance structure that, under Solvency II, brings the capital requirement back to the level of that required under Solvency I. In a step-by-step approach, the paper demonstrates the extent of solvency This paper is a product of the Non-Banking Financial Institutions, Finance and Private Sector Development. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at egurenko@worldbank.org. relief attained by the insurer by applying different possible adjustments in the reinsurance structure.
To evaluate the efficiency of reinsurance as the solvency capital relief instrument, the authors introduce a costof-capital based approach, which puts the achieved capital relief in relation to the costs of extending the reinsurance protection. This approach allows a direct comparison of reinsurance as a capital relief instrument with debt instruments available in the capital market. With the help of the introduced approach, the authors show that the best capital relief efficiency under all examined reinsurance alternatives is achieved when a financial quota share contract is chosen for proportional reinsurance.
Introduction
For a sample insurance portfolio, this paper compares the solvency capital requirements under Solvency I and Solvency II (QIS5 Standard Formula), with the latter taking into account only two risk categories: non-life underwriting risk and counterparty default risk due to reinsurance 3 . The results of this comparison are presented in Section 2.
In Section 3, the paper shows that under Solvency II substantially more extensive reinsurance protection is required to achieve the same minimum level of solvency capital requirements as under Solvency I which results in considerably higher costs of reinsurance. We show that these costs can be reduced only partially by changing the structure of reinsurance coverage. In Section 3 we also introduce the concept of financial quota share reinsurance as a powerful tool for reducing reinsurance costs when reinsurance is used as a solvency relief instrument. Using the capital cost of different instruments as a benchmark, we develop an approach for evaluating the efficiency of reinsurance as a substitute for solvency capital.
Section 4 presents the conclusions and summarizes the main results of the paper.
Solvency capital requirements under Solvency I and Solvency II for a sample insurance portfolio

Sample insurance portfolio and its reinsurance protection
We assume that the sample portfolio contains Motor Liability, Motor Hull, Marine, Fire and General Liability insurance business, cf. For the purposes of this comparison, we ignored such Solvency II risk categories as market risk, operational risk and default risk due to counterparties other than reinsurance as these risk categories have no equivalents in the "old world" of Solvency I. 4 In this paper, the term "ultimate loss ratio" is used to describe the ratio between the ultimate underwriting loss under an annual contract period after its full development and the gross insurance premium written under the contract during the same annual term. 5 Throughout this paper, all figures presented in tables are denominated in thousands (€'000).
Further, we assume that the sample portfolio is protected by proportional reinsurance for such lines of business as Marine and Fire and by the non-proportional excess of loss reinsurance for all lines of business. The following table summarizes the parameters of proportional reinsurance for the sample portfolio. The non-proportional XL (excess of loss) reinsurance is chosen in the way that the company's net retention due to proportional reinsurance is protected up to the level of retained Probable Maximum Loss (PML) for a selected return period with the self-retention of €500,000 for each line of business. Such self-retention represents a common retention choice for a portfolio of given size in emerging markets. The following table illustrates the approach and provides a summary of parameters for the company's XL reinsurance. Please note that under the line of business Fire along with the "pure" fire exposure there is also the natural catastrophe exposure due to earthquake that requires reinsurance cover. This necessitates two XL reinsurance contracts for this line of business -one for the nonnatural-catastrophe per risk exposure and one for the earthquake per event exposure.
According to Solvency I, cf. Section 2.2 below, for calculating solvency capital requirements the total gross and net retained losses for the last three years are required. The following table calculates these parameters assuming (a) that the loss burdens per line of business for the years 2009 and 2010 were equal to the ones of the year 2011 and (b) that within last three years the non-proportional reinsurance contracts paid out €500,000 each. Solvency I 6 First, the Retention Ratio needs to be calculated. The following table provides the result for the sample portfolio whereas the figures in columns A and B were taken from the Table  2 .1.4, columns K and N. The adjusted gross loss in column H of Table 2 .2.3 is the product of the total gross loss plus 50% of the loss for general liability, cf. The capital requirement for non-life underwriting risk is the total of such sub-modules as non-life premium and reserve risk, lapse risk sub-module and catastrophe risk. For the purposes of our calculation, we assumed that the lapse risk can be neglected. Furthermore, we assumed that the sub-module man-made catastrophe risk can be neglected as well. Therefore, under the risk category for non-life underwriting risk, only the sub-modules for premium and reserve risk and natural catastrophe risk need to be considered.
Capital requirement for premium and reserve risk
For calculating the capital requirement for the sub-module premium and reserve risks, we first calculate the net retained premium and reserves. The net retained premium is calculated as the gross premium income net of reinsurance premium. The gross premium and the premium retained after proportional reinsurance for the previous year (2011) were already provided in Section 2.1, Table 2.1.2. We assume that for the next year (2012) these premiums are equal to the ones of 2011. Table 2 .3.1 provides the 2012 reinsurance premiums for non-proportional reinsurance and finally the net premium retained under both proportional and non-proportional reinsurance. For non-proportional reinsurance, we assumed that in 2012 the sample portfolio is protected by the same XL contracts as in 2011. Reinsurance rates on premium in Column C of Table 2 .3.1 were calculated based on market benchmarks for corresponding loss frequencies and loss severities (see Annex A4 for more details). These are gross rates, i.e. they cover both the expected layer loss as well as the reinsurer's costs of capital and administrative expenses allocated to the XL layer.
Along with the net retained premium, one also needs to estimate the provisions for outstanding claims for calculating capital requirements in the premium and reserve risk submodule (see Annex A2). Table 2 .3.2 summarizes our assumptions regarding the provisions for outstanding claims. Assumptions for gross provisions in Column F were made based on the gross premium (Table  2 .1.1, Column A) and the characteristic payout patterns for each line of business. Net retained provisions in Column G were assumed based on the gross provisions in column F and the risk mitigating effect of both proportional and non-proportional reinsurance.
The first step in calculating the capital requirement for premium and reserve risks is to calculate the volume measures for premiums and reserves, cf. 
Capital requirement for natural catastrophe risk
The only natural catastrophe risk covered by the sample portfolio is the earthquake risk. According to 
Total capital requirement for premium and reserve risk and natural catastrophe risk
In this section, we calculate the total capital requirement for premium and reserve risks and the natural catastrophe risk. Capital requirements for these sub-modules taken individually were calculated in sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2. The total capital requirement results from both individual capital requirements and some diversification effects, cf. Annex A2, section A2.1. Table 2 .3.12 results in the capital requirement provided in Table 2 .3.13. 
Total capital requirement for non-life underwriting risk and credit default risk
In this section, we calculate the total capital requirement for non-life underwriting risk and counterparty credit default risk from reinsurance. Taken individually, capital requirements for these sub-modules were calculated in sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4. The total capital requirement takes into account both individual capital requirements and partial diversification effects (see Annex A2, section A2.5). Table 2 .3.13 provides the resulting capital requirement. 
Comparison of capital requirements according to Solvency I and Solvency II
In sections 2.2 and 2.3, capital requirements for the chosen sample portfolio under Solvency I (€ 7.8m) and Solvency II (€ 11.0m) were calculated. As can be seen, the Solvency II capital requirement is more than 40% higher than that of Solvency I which might represent a heavy burden for the company's shareholders. One of the ways to deal with the increased capital requirement is to increase the cession to reinsurance which will reduce the net retained risk exposure and hence the capital requirements. However, this will also increase the costs of reinsurance if no restructuring of reinsurance portfolio is undertaken. In the next section 3, we derive the reinsurance structure which will bring the Solvency II capital requirement to the level of that for Solvency I, discuss different alternatives for the reinsurance structure and compare the resulting costs of reinsurance.
3. Reinsurance portfolio for reducing Solvency II capital requirement to Solvency I level As demonstrated in Section 2, the capital requirement for premium and reserve risk accounts for the largest "portion" of the overall capital requirement. For this reason, our first solution for reducing the solvency capital requirement is to buy more of proportional reinsurance. While in the original sample portfolio there was proportional reinsurance for some lines of business (e.g. Motor, Aviation and Transport (50% cession) and Fire (30% cession)), now we introduce a proportional 50% cession for all lines of business, cf. As far as non-proportional reinsurance is concerned, we first decided not to introduce any material changes. We still have to adjust the required non-proportional capacities to the new values of PMLs retained under proportional reinsurance. Table 3 .2 provides the summary of the non-proportional reinsurance. Table 3 .2: Non-proportional reinsurance (Scenario 1)
The reinsurance premium rates in column H were calculated in the same way as for the original contracts, cf. Table 2 .3.1, column C and Annex A4. The rate for the Marine XL is the same as in the original portfolio because the protected exposure has not changed. For all other XL contracts, the rates have dropped because the exposure to the layers has decreased due to the higher proportional cession of 50%. Table 3 .3 provides the solvency capital requirement which results from the above reinsurance structure defined by Table 3.1 and Table 3 .2. Table 3 .3: Total capital requirement for non-life underwriting risk and credit default risk
As we see, we have achieved a substantial reduction of solvency capital requirement compared to the original portfolio (Table 2 .3.13), however the level of Solvency I (€ 7.8m)
has not yet been achieved. Now, we will adjust the non-proportional reinsurance and see what effect on the capital requirement such an adjustment will have. We will reduce the retentions of nonproportional contract to a € 250k. The following Table 3 .4 summarizes the new nonproportional reinsurance portfolio. Pricing rates in column H were calculated in the same way as for the original contracts, cf. Table 2 .3.1, column C and Table 3 .2, column H and Annex A4.
With these adjusted non-proportional reinsurance contracts, the resulting capital requirement is as per Table 3 .5. One can see that although the resulting capital requirement is getting closer to the one of Solvency I, it is still above it by about € 1.1m. The comparison of Table 3 .3 and Table 3 .5 shows that the capital requirement for the underwriting risk has dropped while the capital requirement for the counterparty default risk has increased. Both movements can be explained by the more extensive XL reinsurance covers in Scenario 2 -the net retained underwriting risk exposure has dropped and the exposure to the credit default risk has increased due to the higher expected loss transferred to reinsurance.
As the next instrument for reducing the capital requirement, we now will examine the effect of improving the reinsurers' credit quality i.e. their credit ratings. In the previous calculations, we assumed that all reinsurance companies in the panel have an A rating. Now we change this assumption and assume that all reinsurance companies have the rating of an AA. Table 3 .6 provides the parameters of non-proportional portfolio with the AA rating. Table 3 .6: Non-proportional reinsurance (Scenario 2, rating AA)
While the reinsurance premium for proportional reinsurance does not depend on the rating, the premium for non-proportional reinsurance does. We assumed that a one notch upgrade in rating, i.e. a change from A to AA, costs 10% more in additional reinsurance premium. Pricing rates in Table 3 .6, column H we obtained by applying a 10% loading on reinsurance pricing rates listed in Table 3 .4, column H.
The resulting capital requirement is provided in Table 3 .7. The resulting capital requirement is now nearly equal to the one of Solvency I, i.e. the desired effect has been achieved. The capital requirement relief is equal to € 11.0m -7.8m = 3.2m.
A comparison of Table 3 .5 and Table 3 .7 shows that the capital requirement for the underwriting risk has not changed much whereas the capital requirement for the counterparty credit default risk has dropped substantially. Such a substantial positive effect on the capital requirement is a result of improved credit quality of the involved reinsurance companies.
Now we compare the costs of reinsurance for the original reinsurance portfolio (cf. As can be seen from the last row of columns C and F in Table 3 .8, the total reinsurance premium of the updated portfolio is about € 18 million higher than that of the original portfolio. The achieved relief of € 3.2 million in the capital requirement has been achieved at the cost of € €28.2m -€10.4m = €17.8 million of additional reinsurance premium! At first glance, it may appear that seeking capital relief through reinsurance, which costs over 500% more than the capital relief itself, makes no economic sense! However, one can easily observe that in the case of proportional reinsurance, the reinsurance premium does not reflect well the actual capital cost of reinsurance protection. It can be shown that if the expected loss ratio materializes, the real cost (we called it P & L statement costs) of proportional reinsurance can be calculated as shown below. In columns H and I of Table 3 .9, we present reinsurance commissions (flat) for different lines of business which were calculated based on the assumed 10% profit margin for the reinsurance company 7 when it has an A rating (original reinsurance, column H) and a 10% lower commission when it has an AA rating (updated reinsurance structure, column I). Now we can compare the overall costs of the original and updated reinsurance portfolio made of reinsurance premium for non-proportional XL reinsurance and P & L statement costs of proportional reinsurance, cf. Table 3 .10. Table 3 .10: total P & L statement costs of reinsurance, original and updated portfolio Based on the P & L statement costs of reinsurance, the additional costs for the updated reinsurance structure calculates to € 6.2m -4.1m = 2.1m -the amount which no longer exceeds the achieved € 3.2 million relief in capital requirement.
To evaluate the efficiency of reinsurance as the solvency capital relief instrument, we now introduce the relative costs of capital ratio which is calculated as the cost of reinsurance divided by the achieved capital relief. Obviously, the lower this ratio, the better the efficiency of the given reinsurance structure as the capital relief instrument. Furthermore, the straight forward cost of capital approach afforded by this ratio also allows a direct comparison of reinsurance as a capital relief instrument with capital borrowed from the capital markets. That is if the rates offered by the capital markets are higher than the relative cost of capital ratio resulting for a prospected reinsurance structure, then a given reinsurance structure has a cost advantage over debt instruments as a solvency capital relief instrument.
In our case, we calculate the relative cost of capital 2.1m / 3.2m = 65.6% (cost of capital relief divided by the capital relief) which clearly is very high. Most likely, the insurance company would be able to borrow from the capital markets at a much lower rate.
To increase the attractiveness of reinsurance as a solvency capital relief instrument compared to borrowing, the cost of reinsurance protection should be reduced substantially. One conventional way to reduce the costs of reinsurance protection is to replace conventional proportional contracts with flat reinsurance commissions with the so called financial quota share (FQS) contracts -a type of proportional contracts which usually has a broad sliding scale reinsurance commission that depends on the underwriting performance of the contract. Such contracts are called financial because along with the transfer of insurance risk they are usually motivated also by financing objectives such as achieving a solvency capital relief.
The diagram below provides an example of a sliding scale reinsurance commission. In the loss ratio range of 45%-85% the reinsurance commission is chosen in the way that the total of the loss ratio and commission is kept constant at 95%. Obviously, the resulting reinsurer's margin in this broad loss ratio range is 5%.
The cost of reinsurance for a financial quota share contract is equal to the reinsurer's margin, in the case of the above diagram 5% of the reinsurance premium. We would like to comment that typically a 5% margin is rather high, but we chose it at 5% to be conservative; in the international reinsurance markets the margins of 2-3% are quite common.
We now calculate the costs of reinsurance for the updated portfolio when the conventional quota share contracts have been replaced with a financial quota share contract for the full amount of proportional reinsurance, with the reinsurer's margin of 5%. The financial quota share contracts do not necessarily need to be taken out for the whole account, as the perline-of-business contracts are possible and can be often seen in practice. Table 3 .11 summarizes the P & L statement costs of proportional reinsurance in the original and updated portfolio. We can now compare the overall costs of the original and updated reinsurance portfolio made of reinsurance premium for non-proportional XL reinsurance and P & L statement costs of proportional reinsurance, cf. Table 3 .12. Now, the additional reinsurance costs for the updated reinsurance structure amount to only € 4.4m -4.1m = 0.3m. With the achieved capital requirement relief of € 7.8m we calculate the relative cost of capital as 0.3/3.2 = 9.4%. Hence, by introducing the financial quota share reinsurance we have achieved a substantial reduction in the cost of capital. Most likely, the resulting cost of capital will compare favorably with the borrowing costs for an emerging market mid-size insurance company. Reinsurance has proven to be a competitive capital relief instrument! We must point out however that to make good use of financial quota share contracts for achieving cost efficient solvency relief, one needs to ensure that such contracts must fulfill certain requirements to qualify as reinsurance for regulatory purposes and hence achieve the desired solvency relief effect. In many cases, the ceding company will be required by law to prove to the market regulator that the contract transfers a substantial amount of risk and hence can be considered a reinsurance contract. If this cannot be proved, the contract will be considered not as reinsurance but as a purely financial instrument and therefore no solvency capital relief effect will be granted. Please refer to the paper "Insurance Risk Transfer and Categorization of Reinsurance Contracts" by the same authors.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have compared solvency capital requirements under Solvency I and Solvency II for a sample mid-size insurance portfolio. We have shown that the capital requirement under the Solvency II regime is substantially higher than under the Solvency I regime. Hence, according to our result, changing the solvency capital regime from Solvency I to Solvency II will lead to a substantial additional solvency capital requirement which might represent a heavy burden for the company's shareholders.
One way to reduce the capital requirement under Solvency II is to increase reinsurance protection, which will reduce the net retained risk exposure and hence also the solvency capital requirement. Therefore, we proposed an extended reinsurance structure which under Solvency II brings the capital requirement back to the level of that required under Solvency I. In a step-by-step approach we demonstrate the extent of solvency relief attained by the insurer by applying different possible adjustments in the reinsurance structure: increasing the cession to proportional reinsurance, reducing the retention of nonproportional reinsurance, and selecting better rated reinsurers for its reinsurance program.
To evaluate the efficiency of reinsurance as the solvency capital relief instrument, we have introduced a cost-of-capital based approach which puts the achieved capital relief in relation to the costs of extending the reinsurance protection. This approach allows a direct comparison of reinsurance as capital relief instrument with debt instruments available in the capital market. With the help of the introduced approach, we have shown that the best capital relief efficiency under all examined reinsurance alternatives is achieved when a financial quota share contract is chosen for proportional reinsurance. For the sample insurance portfolio and the proposed reinsurance structure, we achieved the cost of capital required for the capital relief of less than 10% -a highly competitive rate in comparison with the cost of corporate borrowing in the capital market.
Annex A1 Solvency Capital Requirements according to Solvency I
In order to calculate Solvency Capital Requirements, first one needs to calculate the Retention Ratio Retention Ratio = ( + retained loss report yr.
+ retained loss 1 st yr. before report yr. + retained loss 2 nd yr. before report yr. ) / ( + gross loss report yr. + gross loss 1 st yr. before report yr. + gross loss 2 nd yr. before report yr. ). where mean gross loss of last three years is calculated as mean gross loss of last three yrs = ( + adjusted gross loss report yr. + adjusted gross loss 1 st yr. before report yr. + adjusted gross loss 2 nd yr. before report yr. ) / 3
The expression in brackets in the above formula for the Claims Index is equal to the mean gross loss of last three years up to the limit of € 40.3 M multiplied by 0.26 plus the mean gross loss of last three years in excess of € 40.3 M if any multiplied by 0.23. Adjusted gross loss is equal to the gross loss plus 50% of the gross loss from the lines Aviation Liability, Water Transport Liability and General Liability (if any).
Finally, the Solvency Capital Requirement is calculated as maximum of both Premium Index and Claims Index
Solvency Capital Requirement = max (Premium Index, Claims Index)
If the resulting Solvency Capital Requirement for the report year is lower than for the previous year, the following further calculation needs to be carried out.
Loss reserve ratio = max (1, loss reserves at the end of report yr. / loss reserves at the beginning of report yr.)
Solvency Capital Requirement = max (max (Premium Index, Claims Index), Loss reserve ratio * Solvency Capital Requirement previous yr.)
Annex A2 Solvency Capital Requirements for non-life underwriting risk under Solvency II (QIS5) standard formula
This Annex describes the calculation of solvency capital requirements for non-life underwriting risk according to Solvency II (QIS5) standard formula, as defined by EU document "QIS5 Technical Specification" (Brussels, July 2010).
The Annex is organized as follows. Section A2.1 describes the overall approach for calculating the solvency capital requirement for non-life underwriting risk based on the results of three sub-modules: non-life premium and reserve risk, non-life lapse risk and nonlife catastrophe risk sub-module. Sections A2.2 and A2.4 then provide a detailed explanation of the capital requirement calculation for the sub-modules non-life premium and reserve risk (Section A2.3) and non-life catastrophe risk (Section A2.4). Section A2.3 provides an explanation on the objective and motivation behind the non-life lapse risk sub-module However, the section provides no calculation details as we assume this risk category does not materialize for the sample portfolio under consideration. Finally Section A2.4 explains the aggregation of the capital requirements for the non-life underwriting risk module and the counterparty default risk module (cf. Annex 3). This aggregation takes into account some correlation assumptions between these two risk categories.
A2.1 Calculation of the overall capital requirement for non-life underwriting risk
The non-life underwriting risk module consists of the following sub-modules:
• The non-life premium and reserve risk sub-module 
A2.2 Calculation of the capital requirement for non-life premium and reserve risk
This module considers two main sources of underwriting risk, premium risk and reserve risk. Premium risk results from fluctuations in the timing, frequency and severity of insured events. Premium risk entails the risk that premium provisions turn out to be insufficient to cover claims in full or need to be increased. Reserve risk results from fluctuations in the timing and amount of claim settlements.
In order to carry out the non-life premium and reserve risk calculation, the following parameters need to be determined = Provisions for claims outstanding (best estimate) for each LoB net of recoverables from reinsurance and special purpose vehicles The term is only relevant for contracts with a coverage period that exceeds the following year. For annual contracts without renewal options is zero. Undertakings may not calculate where it is likely not to be material compared to The function ( ) is set in such a way that, assuming a lognormal distribution of the underlying risk, a risk capital requirement consistent with the VaR 99.5% calibration objective is produced. Roughly, ( ) ≈ 3 • .
The volume measure V and the combined standard deviation σ for the overall non-life insurance portfolio are determined in two steps as follows:
• For each individual LoB, the standard deviations and volume measures for both premium risk and reserve risk are determined; • The standard deviations and volume measures for the premium risk and the reserve risk in the individual LoBs are aggregated to derive an overall volume measure V and a combined standard deviation σ.
The calculations needed to perform these two steps are set out below.
Step
1: Volume measures and standard deviations per LoB
The following numbering of LoBs applies for the calculation:
For each LoB, the volume measures and standard deviations for premium and reserve risk are denoted as follows: If the undertaking has committed to its regulator that it will restrict premiums written over the period so that the actual premiums written (or earned) over the period will not exceed its estimated volumes, the volume measure is determined only with respect to estimated premium volumes, so that in this case:
The market-wide estimates of the net standard deviation for premium risk for each line of business are:
The adjustment factor for non-proportional reinsurance of a line of business allows undertakings to take into account the risk-mitigating effect of particular per risk excess of loss reinsurance. Undertakings may choose for each line of business to set the adjustment factor to 1 or to calculate it according to the following algorithm.
Box: Calculation of factors
The adjustment factor for non-proportional reinsurance should only be calculated in relation to per risk excess of loss reinsurance which complies with the following conditions:
• it covers all insurance claims that the insurance or reinsurance undertaking may incur in the segment during the following year; • it allows for reinstatement;
• it meets the requirements for risk mitigation techniques, set out in subsection SCR.13 of the defined by EU document "QIS5 Technical Specification" (Brussels, July 2010).
The terms used in these formulas are defined as follows Where the excess of loss reinsurance contract has no limit the adjustment factor for non-proportional reinsurance of a line of business shall be calculated in the same way as set out above, but with the following changes:
End Box
The volume measure for reserve risk for each individual LoB is determined as follows:
The market-wide estimates of the net of reinsurance standard deviation for reserve risk for each line of business are:
The standard deviation for premium and reserve risk in the individual LoB is defined by aggregating the standard deviations for both sub-risks under the assumption of a correlation coefficient of = 0.5:
The overall volume measure for each LoB, is obtained as follows: ) and ( , , ) denote the volume measures as defined above but restricted to the geographical segment j.
However, the factor should be set to 1 for the line of business credit and suretyship and where the standard deviation for premium or reserve risk of the line of business is an undertaking-specific parameter.
For an undertaking offering insurance in one geographic segment only, the factor is equal to 1.
Undertakings active in more than one geographic segment may choose to allocate all of their business in a line of business to the main geographical segment in order to simplify the calculation.
Step 2: Overall volume measures and standard deviations
The overall volume measure for all LoBs is determined as the total of the volume measures for each LoB:
The overall standard deviation for all LoBs is determined as follows: The correlation matrix is defined as follows
A2.3 Non-life lapse risk
Non-life insurance contracts can include policyholder options which significantly influence the obligations arising from them. Examples for such options are options to terminate a contract before the end of the previously agreed insurance period and options to renew contracts according to previously agreed conditions. Where such policyholder options are included in a non-life insurance contract, the calculation of premium provisions is based on assumptions about the exercise rates of these options. Lapse risk is the risk that these assumptions turn out to be wrong or need to be changed.
Where non-life insurance contracts do not include policyholder options or where the assumptions about the exercise rate of such options have no material influence on premium provisions, the contracts do not need to be included in the calculations of the lapse risk submodule. Where this is the case for the whole portfolio of an undertaking (except for a nonmaterial part) the three components of the sub-module can be set to zero. In this Annex, we assume that this is the case and do not provide calculation details for the non-life lapse risk.
A2.4 Calculation of the capital requirement for non-life catastrophe risk
Under the non-life underwriting risk module, catastrophe risk is defined in the Solvency II Framework Directive (Directive 2009/138/EC) as: "the risk of loss, or of adverse change in the value of insurance liabilities, resulting from significant uncertainty of pricing and provisioning assumptions related to extreme or exceptional events."
CAT risks stem from extreme or irregular events that are not sufficiently captured by the capital requirements for premium and reserve risk. The catastrophe risk capital requirement has to be calibrated at the 99.5% VaR (annual view).
The CAT risk sub-module under the standard formula should be calculated using one of the following alternative methods (or as a combination of both): Standardized Scenarios Method (method 1) or Factor Based Method (method 2) whereas the method 1 should be chosen for all exposures where possible. As usually this will be the case, in this Annex we do not provide any details on the method 2.
The CAT risk sub-module differentiates between natural catastrophes and man-made catastrophes. Perils considered under natural catastrophes are: Windstorm, Flood, Earthquake, Hail, Subsidence. Man-made catastrophes are extreme or exceptional events arising from Motor, Fire, Marine, Aviation, Liability, Credit & Suretyship, Terrorism.
The capital requirement for non-life catastrophe risk is calculated as follows:
where _ _ = Catastrophe capital requirement for natural catastrophes net of risk mitigation _ _ = Catastrophe capital requirement for man-made net of risk mitigation
In the following, we assume that the man-made catastrophe exposure is remote and do not provide any further details on this sub-module.
For calculating _ _ , firstly natural catastrophe capital requirements at country level should be aggregated to estimate the capital requirement at peril level: , , = The entries of the correlation matrix between countries i, j.
Parameters of the correlation matrix are provided in the "Technical Specification". As usually, insurance undertaking will be operating in one country only, we do not provide this lengthy correlation matrix in this Annex.
Then, capital requirements at peril level should be aggregated to estimate the catastrophe capital requirements at total level: , , = The entries of the correlation matrix between perils i, j.
The peril correlation matrix is as follows
Notice that among all perils, some correlation is assumed for the pairs (windstorm; flood) and (windstorm; hail) only.
The capital requirements per peril, country _ gross of reinsurance are obtained from the sum insured aggregates per cresta zone, relativity factor for each zone and the zone aggregation matrix per country. Then the recoverables of reinsurance contract are taken into account. This provides the capital requirements per peril and country net of reinsurance
For example, for earthquake, the calculation is as follows: Finally through taking into account risk mitigating effect of reinsurance, the capital requirement for earthquake net of reinsurance
can be calculated.
Capital requirements for other perils can be calculated analogously, for more details consult "Technical Specification".
Undertakings should note that netting down would not always be possible at a country level. For example you may have a European windstorm program in which case this would still be gross and not adjusted for risk mitigation until aggregating at country level. When netting down, undertakings should take care to adjust and interpret formulae accordingly.
A2.5 Aggregation of capital requirements for non-life underwriting risk and default risk
Aggregation of capital requirements for non-life underwriting risk and counterparty default risk takes into account some correlation assumptions. These assumptions are summarized by the following matrix (Technical Specification, SCR1.32)
The aggregation calculates with the following According to SCR6.55, Quantile factor can be chosen as
Calculation of the variance is described in SCR6.7. We differentiate between counterparties belonging to different rating classes from AAA to CCC. We assume that in our case there are M rating classes for reinsurance counterparties. For each rating class j we first calculate and according to
where the sums are over all counterparties in the rating class j and denotes the total number of counterparties in the rating class j.
Then, we calculate
Finally, the coefficients and are calculated from the default probabilities valid for each different rating class 
Annex A4
Indicative pricing of non-proportional reinsurance for the sample portfolio
The indicative pricing of non-proportional reinsurance in this paper is based on the following formalism.
For an arbitrary non-proportional reinsurance layer, we first introduce the parameter called layer centroid which has the following property: Expected loss covered by a layer A xs B with the liability limit A and retention B is equal to the liability level of the layer multiplied by the expected number of losses higher than the centroid of this layer.
where . denotes the expected loss covered by the layer A xs B and .
> denotes the expected number of losses higher than the layer centroid.
From the above relation, we then derive for the net rate on line of the layer A xs B:
Therefore, the layer price parameter NetRoL which is per definition equal to the expected loss covered by the layer divided by the layer liability limit can be calculated as the expected number of losses higher than the layer centroid.
For calculating .
> we use the following relation
where .
> denotes the expected number of losses higher than lower loss limit (LLL) -the lower threshold of the loss severity distribution; ( > ) denotes the probability that the loss severity is higher than layer centroid LC according to the chosen loss severity distribution and ( ) denotes the cumulative distribution function of the chosen loss severity distribution. We further assume that > and that due to the fact that is the lower threshold of loss severity distribution ( ≤ ) = ( ) = 0.
For calculating NetRoL according to (A4.e2) and (A4.e3), the value of the layer centroid is required. It can be shown that the following expression provides a good proxy:
Layer centroid of the layer A xs B ≅ � • ( + ) (A4.e4)
With the proxy (A4.e4), we can calculate NetRoL of an arbitrary layer A xs B which expresses the expected loss covered by the layer divided by the liability limit A. The market price of layer can be expressed with help of the parameter called GrossRoL which expresses the total of the expected loss covered by the layer and the costs allocated to the layer (costs of capital and management expenses) divided by the liability limit A.
Instead of estimating the costs in (A4.e5), we apply an approach as adopted by capital markets when pricing catastrophe bonds. It estimates the GrossRoL as a product of NetRoL and the factor called Multiple which expresses the relation of the gross layer price (which includes the expected loss and the allocated costs) to the pure expected loss.
Expected loss covered by the layer A xs B and the reinsurance premium can be calculated from the net and gross rate on line according to the following:
Often, the expected loss and the price of an XL layer are expressed as rate on GNPI (gross net premium income) -premium retained under preceding proportional reinsurance (if any): where denotes the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution, LLL and ULL denote the lower and the upper loss limit respectively. The following Table A4 .1 summarizes the chosen parameter of Pareto distribution per line of business. The values of Pareto Alpha in column C were chosen according to market benchmarks. Table A4 .1: Parameters of the loss severity distribution (Pareto).
The following Table A4 .2 provides the estimates for .
>
-the expected number of losses higher than LLL, cf. (A4.e3) . The values in column D are the assumed frequencies p.a. per € 1 m premium. For simplicity reasons, we assumed the same frequency for each line of business, in-line with market benchmarks. The values in column F (except for fire earthquake) were obtained by multiplying the premiums in column E by the frequencies per € 1m premium (Table A4 .1, column D). Obviously, the frequency of the earthquake loss does not depend on premium. It was estimated directly assuming the return period of 10 years for the loss higher than the lower loss threshold which translates into the frequency of 0.1. Table A4 .2: Loss frequencies Based on the formalism presented above (A4.e1 -A4.e11) and the parameters of loss severity and loss frequency distributions summarized in Tables A4.1 and A4.2, we estimated the prices of all XL layers throughout the paper. Below we provide calculation details for the layers of the original reinsurance structure, cf. Section 2.1. All other layers were priced analogously. Table A4 .3 summarizes the parameters of the original reinsurance portfolio. Table A4 .3: Parameters of the original reinsurance portfolio.
Based on the layer parameters provided in Table A4 .3, columns I and J, we then calculated layer centroids and the expected number of losses higher than layer centroid, cf. Table A4 .4. Table A4 .4: Layer centroids and expected number of losses higher than layer centroid For calculating column M, we used (A4.e4) and for calculating column N (A4.e3) and (A4.e11). Please notice that in (A4.e11) the lower and upper loss limits from Table A4 .4 columns K and L were used. These loss limits were obtained from the original loss limits (Table A4 .1, columns A and B) through applying the retention ratio under the proportional reinsurance. Table A4 .5 provides the results for NetRoL and GrossRoL per line of business. Table A4 .5: Net and gross RoL For calculating column O, we used (A4.e2). The Multiples in column P were assumed based on market benchmarks. For calculating column Q, we used (A4.e6).
Finally, Table A4 .6 calculates the expected loss covered by the XL layers and the reinsurance premium as € figures as well as the net and gross rates on GNPI. Table A4 .6: Expected covered loss, reinsurance premium, net and gross rate on GNPI For calculating column R, we used (A4.e7), for column S (A4.e7), for column T (A4.e9) and for column U (A4.e10). In the paper, these results were used in Tables 2.3.1 and 2.3.9, cf. Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.4.
